This paper provides an empirical investigation of the factors that in ‡uence the appearance and success of voter referenda to raise public funds for open-space conservation. We take advantage of a data set that includes detailed information on all such referenda that occurred in the United States between 1998 and 2003. Combining these data with information from the U.S. Census and state-speci…c variables, we conduct a nationwide analysis along with focused studies of referenda that occurred in New Jersey and Massachusetts. While some of the results corroborate …ndings in the existing literature, other results are new. Most notably, this study provides the …rst investigation of how funding mechanisms and funding rates a¤ect voter support for public acquisition of open space. We also provide evidence on the relationship between existing patterns of open space and voter support for openspace referenda. As open-space initiatives continue to gain popularity at the ballot box, the descriptive insights of this paper should prove useful for both policy-makers and advocates working in the area of land use management.
Introduction
The protection of open space from the advance of "urban sprawl"has emerged as one of the more pressing environmental issues in the United States. Open space is generally understood to be a public good that will be under-provided without policy interventions. Policy-makers have begun e¤orts to protect open-space using various instruments-including zoning regulations, development taxes, urban growth boundaries, conservation easements, and public 2 These data include each referendum's political jurisdiction, proportion voting for and against, …nancing mechanism, 1 Up to date details on the number of open-space referenda and total funds raised can be found on the Trust for Public Lands website at http://www.tpl.org. 2 The reports were published as Voters Invest in Open Space between 1998 and 2000 and were renamed LandVote beginning in 2001. In total, these reports summarize the results of 968 state, county, and local ballot questions on open space. The reports attempt to be comprehensive and include only referenda involving the direct acquisition of undeveloped land or farmland. Ballot measures for related policies, such as growth controls, are not included. …nancing rate, land characteristics, and other policy-relevant variables. For each jurisdiction we also collect data from the U.S. Census on socioeconomic characteristics. Then, using the combined data, we estimate econometric models to determine the impact of referendum characteristics and socioeconomic variables on voting results.
In addition to the nationwide analysis, we conduct two focused studies of referenda that occurred in New Jersey and Massachusetts. Statewide policies were passed in both states to Other researchers have investigated related questions. In a pioneering study of referenda results, Deacon and Shapiro (1975) analyze voting outcomes for a law in California to protect coastal zones from development. They …nd some evidence that the natural coastal environment is a normal good, but the e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) also analyze statewide referenda in California. Three of the referenda they study were to authorize bond issues to purchase park, forest, and wildlife areas. They …nd evidence that collectively provided open space is a normal good, except when income is very high, in which case it becomes inferior. They also …nd that people are more likely to vote yes in more urban counties. Another study by Kline and Wichelns (1994) uses statewide referenda in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island to investigate demand for the purchase of farmland development rights. They …nd that the proportion of yes votes increases with a town's population growth, home value appreciation, farmland loss, urbanization, and prevalence of resource sensitive lands.
Because the aforementioned studies use local voting results in statewide referenda, they cannot address the question of what factors contribute to the appearance of an open-space referendum in the …rst place. Howell-Moroney (2004) considers this question in a study of municipalities throughout the Delaware Valley region. He …nds that the appearance of a referendum is responsive to patterns of land use, whereby low population density and loss of open space increase the probability of a referendum occurring. He also …nds that higher population and median household income increases the probability of a referendum. 3 Our paper makes four primary contributions to the literature. First, we construct the most comprehensive data set on open-space referenda to date. Second, we take advantage of variation in the …nancing mechanism across referenda (e.g., bonds or taxes) in order to investigate whether the type of mechanism proposed a¤ects voter support for open-space acquisition. Third, we exploit variation is the funding rates within the di¤erent mechanisms (e.g., bond amounts and tax rates) to determine how responsive voters are to the costs of an open-space initiative. Fourth, we conduct detailed analyses of two states in order to determine the factors that in ‡uence the appearance of a referendum, in addition to the factors that in ‡uence a referendum's success.
The results provide new insights into citizen preferences for open space and the relationship between characteristics of an open-space policy and voter support. We …nd strong evidence that voters are more likely to approve bonds than tax increases. Not surprisingly, funding rates also matter. Higher rates generally decrease the odds of a yes vote, but interestingly, the opposite result emerges at the state and county levels. In general, we …nd that the factors in ‡uencing referenda outcomes di¤er between the state-county level and the local level.
3 Howell-Moroney's study is a response to another paper by Romero and Liserio (2002) . The latter uses nationwide data on referenda that occurred between 1998 and 1999, and it …nds that only socioeconomic factors motivate open-space referenda, while actual patterns of land use do not play a role. Romero and Liserio's conclusion is questionable, however, because of a number of methodological concerns. See HowellMoroney's paper for a detailed discussion. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 3 provides details on the econometric speci…cations. Section 4 reports the results of the nationwide analysis along with the results of the New Jersey and Massachusetts studies. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main results.
Data
We collected data on open-space referenda from the annual LandVote survey published by the Trust for Public Lands (TPL) and the Land Trust Alliance (LTA). The LandVote survey attempts to provide a comprehensive listing of all open-space referenda that involve the direct acquisition of undeveloped land.
5 Using the information contained in the LandVote survey, we generated variables for several characteristics of each open-space referendum.
These variables include the referendum's date, whether the initiative passed, proportion voting yes, level of government, funding mechanism, funding rate, whether farmland was 4 Many of our results are comparable to …ndings in other strands of the literature on open space. These studies employ contingent valuation (Bre-e, Morey, Lodder, 1998; Champ et al., 2002; Vossler et al., 2003) , stated preferences for di¤erent types of open space (Kline and Wichelns, 1998) , and revealed preferences for existing open space (Bates and Santerre, 2001) . We refer to the …ndings of these studies where appropriate in the discussion of our results.
5 Publication of the LandVote survey began in 1998, and data for selected years are available online at www.landvote.org. Data for other years can be obtained from the TPL upon request. included as part of the initiative, and whether the initiative extended an existing program or created a new one.
For each referendum's jurisdiction, we also collected data from the U.S. Census online summary …les for 1990 and 2000. These data include each jurisdiction's population, population growth, population density, age pro…le, household income, home value, and home ownership rate.
Further data were collected for the New Jersey and Massachusetts studies. To compare jurisdictions that did and did not hold a referendum, we collected Census data for all local jurisdictions in both states. Additional data were collected on existing property taxes in all local jurisdictions, and on policy variables that are speci…c to the ballot initiatives that occurred in each state. We also obtained geographic information system (GIS) data on existing levels of open-space and recent rates of open-space loss. These data and variables speci…c to New Jersey and Massachusetts are described in detail in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
Of the 968 referenda in the LandVote survey between 1998 and 2003, a total of 857 observations were included in the …nal data set.
6 These referenda occurred in 771 di¤erent jurisdictions. Eighty-six jurisdictions held more than one referendum between 1998 and 2003.
In some cases more than one attempt was made to pass an open-space policy, while in other cases more than one policy was approved. The entire data set covers 38 di¤erent states, although the majority of referenda took place in the northeast and mid-atlantic regions. 6 The remaining 111 observations were not included for four possible reasons. First, the referenda's jurisdiction was a park district that was not coterminous with any jurisdiction for which we could obtain corresponding Census data (27 observations). Second, even after consulting with TPL sta¤, the information provided in LandVote was not su¢ cient to match the jurisdiction with a corresponding location in the U.S. Census (14 observations). Third, the initiative passed in a town meeting rather than having been put to a general election (7 observations). Finally, the referendum's …nancing data was not available because it was missing or the initiative did not involve a direct commitment of funds, as is the case with a simple advisory measure (63 observations). It is not reported in Table 1 but worth mentioning that the di¤erent …nancing mechanisms
were not evenly distributed among the levels of government. Seventy percent of the statelevel referenda were for bond issues, and the remaining thirty percent were in the "other"
category. In contrast, 40 percent of the county-level referenda were bond issues, and 50 percent were property tax or sales tax increases. The …nancing mechanisms were more evenly distributed among the local-level referenda.
Panel B in Table 1 Panel C in Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the funding rate variables. For example, the mean property tax increase was 0.28 mills (i.e., 28 cents per thousand dollars of tax-assessed value). The variation in magnitude within the funding rates is quite pronounced.
The property tax increases, for example, range from 0.001 mills to 2.5 mills. This di¤erence implies that for a household with a tax-assessed property value of $150,000, the increased 7 A property tax surcharge imposes a percentage increase in one's property tax bill. A surcharge is distinct from a property tax millage because it typically allows for additional exemptions and/or may be levied on a subset of the taxable population. The units also di¤er: property taxes are based on a millage applied to tax-assessed value, and surcharges are based on a percentage applied to a property-tax bill. 8 The Other category includes parcel taxes, real estate transfer taxes, use taxes, retailers' occupation taxes, lottery taxes, hotel taxes, and intragovernmental transfers. 9 A distinct advantage of the data is the fact that jurisdictions are often constrained regarding their choice of funding mechanism. In New Jersey and Massachusetts, for example, state law requires property taxes and property tax surcharges, respectively. Thus, in our econometric models, it is reasonable to treat the funding mechanism as exogenous to the level of voter support. tax burden ranges from 15 cents per year to $375 per year. The bond amounts also cover a wide range, from $25,000 in Baltimore County, Maryland to $2.3 billion in the state of California. With our econometric analysis, which we describe in the next section, we also test whether funding rates a¤ect voting outcomes.
The socioeconomic variables that we obtained from the U.S. Census are de…ned in Table   2 . When appropriate, we report means for the sample of jurisdictions that held a referendum and compare them to the national averages. The t-statistics in Table 2 are based on a test of whether the sample mean is statistically di¤erent from the national average. All tests are statistically signi…cant except for the one comparing the proportions of the population over the age of 65. Compared to national averages, jurisdictions that have held an openspace referendum tend to have higher population growth and greater density.
10 They also tend to have greater household incomes, home values, and home ownership rates. In our studies of New Jersey and Massachusetts, we estimate probit models to test more formally for di¤erences between those jurisdictions that have held a referendum and those that have not.
Econometric Speci…cations
We estimate regression models to explain the election outcomes of open-space referenda.
The dependent variable in our models is
where P i is the proportion of yes votes out of the total number of votes cast in referendum i.
This variable is often referred to as the log-odds ratio, and it is commonly used in econometric The equations that we estimate for the nationwide data have the general form
where Mech i is a categorical variable indicating the referendum's funding mechanism; Rate i is a vector of the funding rate variables that equal zero if the funding rate does not apply;
Extend i is a dummy variable indicating whether the referendum extends an existing policy; Farm i is a dummy variable indicating whether farmland is part of the proposed land acquisitions; NotNov i is a dummy variable indicating whether the referendum took place o¤ a typical election cycle in November; Socio i is a vector of the socioeconomic variables that includes those listed in Table 2 ; Gov i is a categorical variable indicating whether the referendum occurred at the state, county, or local level; s is a state-speci…c intercept; t is a year-speci…c intercept; and " i is a random error term.
The log-odds model speci…ed in (2) has a microeconomic foundation. Deacon and Shapiro (1975) develop a model that begins with individual preferences and aggregates up to collective voting results. The log-odds speci…cation is a simpli…ed version of their model's empirical implication. 12 This micro foundation implies that the aggregate voting results can be used to make inferences about voter preferences. The validity of making such inferences has empirical support as well. A study by Fischel (1979) found little di¤erence in a comparison between aggregate voting results and individual preferences for an environmental referendum in New
Hampshire.
The independent variables in regression model (2) are useful for answering several questions and controlling for potentially important e¤ects. The inclusion of Mech i enables consideration of how voting outcomes respond to the funding mechanism of the initiative.
To accurately test for such di¤erences, all of the continuous variables in equation (2), which include Rate i and Socio i , are demeaned. 13 The coe¢ cients on Rate i will provide an estimate of the responsiveness of voter support to the funding rates. Extend i and Farm i will determine whether selected characteristics of the open-space proposal a¤ect its success. NotNov i will determine whether holding the referendum outside the typical cycle in November a¤ects voter support. Socio i will be useful to detect factors that in ‡uence preferences for open space, such as income and population density. Gov i will indicate whether election results di¤er between levels of government. Finally, the state-and year-speci…c intercepts will control for unobserved state and year heterogeneity.
We estimate the models using weighted least squares (WLS) to account for heteroskedasticity due to the analysis of averaged, grouped data. The weight for each observation i is
, where n i is Population andP i is the predicted proportion of yes votes.
14 Using these weights implements the minimum chi-squared estimator, and the e¤ect (which we discuss more in the next section) is to place more weight on referenda in jurisdictions with larger populations.
Our analysis of New Jersey and Massachusetts referenda di¤ers somewhat because of the availability and nature of the data. Using the additional Census data on jurisdictions that did not hold an open-space referendum, we are able to investigate the factors that in ‡uence the appearance of a referendum in a local jurisdiction. We assume the underlying propensity of a jurisdiction to hold a referendum is given by
where Avproptax i is a variable for the jurisdiction's average residential property tax payment, 
Assuming u i is normally distributed, the parameters of (3) can be estimated with a probit model:
where ( ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We estimate this model for both New Jersey and Massachusetts in order to determine how the explanatory variables a¤ect a jurisdiction's probability of holding an open-space referendum.
We also estimate log-odds models for New Jersey and Massachusetts to explain election outcomes where they did occur. For these models, we include only those referenda that were part of statewide initiatives to encourage open-space conservation (described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3). These include all of the 237 referenda in New Jersey and 122 of the 137 referenda in Massachusetts. A nice feature of these data is that all referenda within each state proposed the same funding mechanism but with varying funding rates. Accordingly, the models require fewer explanatory variables than were included in (2). The estimated equations have the general form 15 We describe in detail the data used for these speci…c variables in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
where Rate i is a variable for the funding rate of the mechanism within the state, X i is vector of state-speci…c policy variables, t is a year-speci…c intercept, and v i is a random error term.
These models are estimated with WLS using the same weights as those discussed previously.
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For each state we also estimated Heckman two-step models linking equations (4) and (5).
This procedure accounts for potential sample-selection bias that may arise from estimating equation (5) on its own. The approach, however, is somewhat limited in this context because of the nature of the data. To fully correct for sample-selection bias, all of the variables in the regression equation (5) would need to be in the selection equation (4) as well (see Greene, 2000) . 17 But this is not possible here, as data for Rate i and X i only exist for places that actually held a referendum. We nevertheless estimate the selection models to account for some degree of potential bias, but as we discuss later, the selection bias is not statistically signi…cant in any of the estimated equations.
Estimation and Results
We report the econometric results in this section. Those for the nationwide analysis are reported …rst, followed by those for New Jersey and Massachusetts.
Nationwide
We begin with estimates of equation (2) using the nationwide sample of 857 referenda. These results are reported as the pooled model in Table 3 . We also estimate equation (2) using two subsets of the data: one includes all of the local-level referenda, and the other includes all of the state-and county-level referenda. These models are reported as the local and state- 16 We collected data for other variables that are not included in the …nal speci…cations because the results were never statistically signi…cant. For both states, these include variables based on voting results for the 2000 presidential election. For Massachusetts, we also found statistically insigni…cant e¤ects for the mechanism by which the referendum was put on the ballot (see footnote 40 for more details). 17 Ideally, in order to avoid identi…cation on functional form alone, there should also be an identifying restriction of at least one variable in equation (4) that is not in equation (5). county models in Table 3 . 18 For all three models, we report standard errors that are robust to clustering at the jurisdiction level; this accounts for the fact some referenda occurred within the same jurisdiction and therefore may not be entirely independent observations. about the costs of bonds, whereas the costs of tax increases are readily apparent. Note that each of these possible explanations con ‡icts with the general notion of Ricardian equivalence, which implies that citizens should be indi¤erent between the di¤erent funding mechanisms.
Thus, we conclude that either Ricardian equivalence does not hold in this context, or that voters are subject to a form of …scal illusion.
22
Before looking at the results for the funding rates, it is important to recognize that 21 The proportional change in the odds ratio with a change in a dummy variable from 0 to 1 is given by e 1, where is the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable (see Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980) . 22 The di¤erent ideas suggested in this paragraph are working hypotheses. We are unable to distinguish between them in this study, yet they all underscore the importance of characterizing empirical trends in local public …nance and beginning to think about theoretical underpinnings. As such, work of this type contributes to the emerging agenda in the new …eld of behavioral public …nance (see McCa¤ery and Slemrod, 2004 The results provide evidence in both directions. In the local model, all funding rate coe¢ cients, except for the one on sales taxes, are negative, suggesting that higher funding rates decrease voter support at the local level. But the only coe¢ cient that is statistically signi…cant is the one on bond rates. The results are di¤erent in the state-county model. The coe¢ cients on property tax and bond rates are both positive and statistically signi…cant.
These di¤ering results in the local and state-county models can be explained with the two countervailing e¤ects of having to pay more oneself versus bene…ting from spillins.
First consider a tax. A citizen's personal tax burden does not depend on the political jurisdiction-for example, a property tax increase of 1 mill imposes the same cost regardless of whether a state, county, or town collects the revenue. In contrast, one would expect the spillins to be smaller in local jurisdictions than in states and counties. Thus, it would not be surprising for the e¤ect of the individual tax burden to dominate the spillin e¤ect at the local level, but not at the state or county level. This reasoning is consistent with Proptaxrate having a negative (though insigni…cant) e¤ect in the local model and a positive e¤ect in the state-county model. 23 In the public …nance literature, "spillins"refer to the public-good bene…ts that individuals receive beyond what they actually pay for-that is, the bene…ts they enjoy from the public-good provision by others. Now consider how the e¤ect of the bond rate may di¤er between levels of government. In this case, a voter's personal cost of a bond does in fact depend on the political jurisdiction because more people share the costs of a bond in a state or county than in a local jurisdiction.
In contrast, spillins for a given bond rate will not depend on the size of the jurisdiction, Other studies have found mixed results for the income e¤ect: some …nd evidence that open space is a normal good (Bre-e, Morey, and Lodder, 1998; Bates and Santerre, 2001), some …nd no signi…cant e¤ect (Deacon and Shapiro, 1975; Kline and Wichelns, 1994; Romero and Liserio, 2002) , and one study …nds that open space is generally a normal good but may become inferior at high levels of income (Kahn and Matsusaka, 1997) . 24 None of the socioeconomic variables has statistically signi…cant explanatory power in the state-county model. 
New Jersey
New Jersey is the most highly represented state in the data set. Since 1989 state legislation has been in place that enables local jurisdictions to impose property taxes for the purpose of open-space acquisition. The state approved further legislation in 1997, called the Green 24 We attempted to replicate Kahn and Matsusaka's (1997) result by estimating all of the models with the inclusion of a quadratic term for median household income. While the same pattern emerged, neither of the income coe¢ cients were statistically signi…cant. 25 We do not include Homevalue in any of the regressions in Table 3 because it is highly correlated with Income. Inclusion of both variables renders neither statistically signi…cant in all models. This is not the case, however, in the New Jersey and Massachusetts models. The estimated probit model is reported in the …rst column of Standard errors in column (2) are robust to clustering at the jurisdiction level. One, two, or three asterisks indicate signi…cance at the levels p < 0.10, p < 0.05, or p < 0.01, respectively.
age of total land area-increases the probability of a referendum appearing on a ballot. 
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We now turn to the WLS estimates of equation (5). Mirroring the nationwide analysis, we include the variables Proptaxrate, Extend, and Farm. Because of the relatively high proportion of jurisdictions that held more than one referendum, we include two additional variables to investigate the interaction between repeat initiatives. Repeat is a dummy variable indicating whether the jurisdiction held one or more prior open-space referenda within the study period. Priorpass is a dummy variable indicating whether one or more of the prior referenda passed. We estimate the model using all of the New Jersey referenda that were part of the Green Acres Program. 31 These results are reported in the second column of Table 4 . Once again, the reported standard errors are robust to clustering at the jurisdiction level. For purposes of comparison, we also estimate the model excluding referenda that were 29 This result for open-space loss, along with those for population and population growth, are consistent with Howell-Moroney's (2004) …ndings in the Delaware Valley region. 30 Hedonic studies have found evidence that open space has a positive e¤ect on residential property values (e.g., Irwin, 2002; Smith, Poulos, and Kim, 2002) . 31 This includes all 237 referenda that occurred in New Jersey; however, only 227 observations are used in the estimation. The reason for the di¤erence is that data for Proptaxrate was missing for 10 observations. repeat initiatives within a jurisdiction. While this model is based on fewer observations, it enables us to focus on …rst-time referenda and to report unclustered standard errors that are not biased. These results are reported in the third column of Table 4.   32 Both models generate similar results, although di¤er somewhat with respect to the coe¢ cients that are statistically signi…cant. The e¤ect of Proptaxrate is negative, but only signi…cant in the model without repeat observations. For …rst-time referenda, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient implies that an increase in the property tax rate of 0.1 mills decreases the proportion of yes votes from 60 percent to 58 percent on average. percent, a min of 1.6, and a max of 8.1. Admittedly, it is di¢ cult to explain what may be driving these results, but the fact that we have data for OSloss at the county level rather than the local level is a limitation. In our study of Massachusetts, we address this limitation because open-space data are available at the local level. We discuss this further in Section 4.3, where for Massachusetts we also …nd a negative linear relationship with OSloss, but the coe¢ cients in the quadratic speci…cation have the opposite signs.
Three of the socioeconomic variables are statistically signi…cant in models (2) and (3) in Table 4 . The positive coe¢ cient on Over65 implies that a higher proportion of senior citizens in a jurisdiction increases voter support. In the No Repeat model, the e¤ects of Income and Homevalue are statistically signi…cant and follow the same pattern as that in the probit model. Greater income increases voter support in addition to the probability of a referendum occurring. In contrast, greater home value decreases voter support in addition to the probability of a referendum occurring. In both models, the e¤ect of the average, residential property tax payment is statistically insigni…cant.
Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Community Preservation Act (CPA) passed in 2000. The law is similar to New Jersey's Green Acres program in that it o¤ers state matching funds to communities that raise property taxes for open-space conservation. 35 Rather than levying a property tax millage, however, the CPA authorizes communities to levy a surcharge of up to 3 percent on existing property tax bills. Optional provisions of the policy include three exemptions from the surcharge: one for low-income families and low-to moderate-income senior citizens; one for the …rst $100,000 of the tax-assessed value of all properties; and one for commercial and industrial properties.
Our analysis of referenda that were part of the CPA follows the same methodology as that for New Jersey. We collected socioeconomic data for all 351 local jurisdictions in Massachusetts, of which 115 held a CPA referendum. 36 In order to account for the di¤er-ent exemptions, we collected further data from the Massachusetts Community Preservation
Coalition on which exemptions applied to each referendum. From this data we generated three dummy variables-Lowinc, First100K, and Comind-to indicate whether the respective exemption applied. The variable Avproptax is still de…ned as each jurisdiction's average, annual residential property tax payment in 2000. 37 There were eight jurisdictions that had 35 In addition to promoting open space, the CPA is intended to promote historic preservation and a¤ordable housing. The law requires that at least 10 percent of the funds be spent on each of the three objectives, with the remaining 70 percent allocated at the local legislature's discretion. Speci…c allocations were not speci…ed prior to elections. To date, approximately 42 percent of CPA-funded projects have been for open-space and recreation. Up to date details are available on the Massachusetts Community Preservation Coalition's webpage at http://www.communitypreservation.org. 36 Beyond the observations included in LandVote, we obtained data on the six CPA referenda that occurred between January and July of 2004. These data are available from the Community Preservation Coalition's webpage (see footnote 35). These referenda were not included in the full data set because comparably up to date information was not available for the rest of the country. 37 These data were obtained from the Massachusetts Department of Revenue and are available online at http://www.dls.state.ma.us/mdmstuf/proptax.htm. two ballot initiatives. Since the …rst attempt failed in all eight of these jurisdictions, there is no Priorpass variable for Massachusetts.
Another di¤erence in the Massachusetts analysis is that the open-space data are disaggregated to the level of the local jurisdiction. The variable Openspace is now de…ned as the local jurisdiction's percent of total land area that was undeveloped in 1999. OSloss is de…ned as the percent change in a local jurisdiction 's undeveloped land that occurred between 1985 and 1999. 38 The …rst column of Table 5 The WLS estimates of the log-odds model are reported in the second column of Table   5 . We include all of the referenda in the estimation and report clustered standard errors. 39 38 We obtained these data on open space, which are only available for selected years, from the Massachusetts O¢ ce of Geographic and Environmental Information. The …les are available online at http://www.mass.gov/mgis. 39 Once again, we only report the WLS estimates without the two-step correction for sample-selection bias. As with New Jersey, the selection bias in Massachusetts was insigni…cant in all of our speci…cations. The surcharge rate has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on voter support. The magnitude of the e¤ect is such that starting from the average of 51 percent of the voters voting yes, a one-percentage point increase in the surcharge rate drops the share of yes votes to 45 percent. This result has an important implication: given the marginal pass rate of most of the CPA referenda, the marginal e¤ect of the surcharge rate appears pivotal to many of the election outcomes. Since the average surcharge rate is 2.4 percent among the CPA referenda, it appears that many unsuccessful ballot initiatives might have been successful with a more modest surcharge.
Of the three exemptions, only the low-income family and low-to moderate-income elderly exemption has a statistically signi…cant e¤ect. The positive sign of the coe¢ cient is intuitive, as those who can least a¤ord a tax increase and are likely to pay a relatively small share are those who are exempt from having to pay it. Sixty-seven percent of the referenda had this exemption. The insigni…cance of the other two exemptions may be due to insu¢ cient variation in the data. Almost all of the referenda had the exemption on the …rst $100,000
(84 percent), while very few had the commercial and industrial exemption (10 percent). than local-level data, the negative linear relationship is common between the two states.
Returning to the WLS model in Table 5 , three other variables have statistically signi…cant e¤ects. The negative coe¢ cient on Over65 implies that a higher proportion of senior citizens decreases voter support. The positive coe¢ cient on Homevalue indicates that higher home values increase the proportion of yes votes. Finally, the negative coe¢ cient on Avproptax implies that higher average property tax payments decrease voter support, perhaps because voter feel their property taxes are already too high, and higher property taxes imply higher surcharges. Interestingly, this variable has the opposite sign in the probit model. This di¤erence may be due to the fact that small coalitions within a jurisdiction can put an initiative on the ballot, but the preferences of the coalition may di¤er from the more general voting population.
40 40 The Massachusetts initiatives can be put on a ballot one of three ways: a petition, a town meeting, or a city council decision. For all the initiatives, we collected data from the Massachusetts Community Preservation Coalition on how each referendum was put on the ballot. Including these variables in the WLS model, we found no signi…cant e¤ect on voting outcomes.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical investigation of the factors that in ‡u-ence the appearance and success of voter referenda for open-space conservation. We take advantage of a data set that includes detailed information on all such referenda that occurred in the United States between 1998 and 2003. Combining these data with information from the U.S. Census and state-speci…c variables, we conduct a nationwide analysis along with focused analyses in New Jersey and Massachusetts. Six general questions motivate the paper. We reiterate these questions here to organize our main conclusions. How does an initiative's funding mechanism a¤ect the way citizens vote? Voters are far more likely to vote in favor of an open-space policy that approves bond …nancing rather than a tax increase. Bonds are preferred to a variety of tax types, including property taxes, property tax surcharges, sales taxes, and income tax surcharges. This preference holds regardless of whether the referendum is held at the local, state, or county level. In many cases, the di¤erence between …nancing with a bond or a tax determines whether a referendum passes or fails. 
